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Abstract
We examine the impact of discrimination on labour market performance when workers are sub-
ject to a risk of losing skills during an unemployment experience. Within a search and matching
framework, we show that both natives and immigrants are affected by discrimination. Discrimina-
tion in one sector has positive spill-overs, inducing employment to increase in the other sector and
the effect on labour market performance therefore depends on whether discrimination is present in
only one sector or in both sectors. Discrimination may induce workers to train more or less than
natives after having lost their skills, dependent upon which sector there is discrimination. Net
output tends to the be most negatively affected by discrimination among high-skilled workers.
Keywords: discrimination, unemployment, search and matching, wages.
JEL classifications: J15, J31, J61, J64, J71
1 INTRODUCTION
Several studies have found that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had effects on the
USA labour market outcomes of individuals with country of origin profiles similar to those of the
terrorists.1 Similarly, Zussman (2010) finds that ethnic bias in judicial decision-making in Israel
depends on the number of fatalities from recent attacks in the vicinity of the court but not in other
places. Discrimination can be a reaction to external events where none of the parts are involved. It
is yet to been seen whether the recent attacks in Paris and Copenhagen will have a similar impact on
the labour market.
This paper considers the impact of discrimination on labour market performance for both natives
and immigrants. We are interested in the impact on wages and unemployment for different skill levels
and ethnicities as well as the effect on training and inequality.
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†Regeringskansliet, Stockholm.
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The novelty of this paper is to study the effects of discrimination of immigrants on labour market
performance taking into account that workers risk losing skills during an unemployment spell and that
firms supplying vacancies to any high or low productivity worker, not distinguishing by ethnicity, are
potentially affected by discrimination.2 The issue is that the impact of discrimination is potentially
amplified if workers are subject to the risk of losing skills during their unemployment spell. Discrimi-
nation may not only result in natives and immigrants getting different pay for the same work, but also
in workers with similar skill levels ending up in different occupations.
Following the empirical literature mentioned above, we model discrimination as a capricious re-
jection of immigrant applicants. Negative events, such as unexpected violent political or religious
motivated developments, trigger these rejections. After a trigger event, an immigrant worker does not
get a job offer, while a native worker does. In the model we assume that unemployed workers who lose
their skills only can search for jobs in the low-productivity sector.3 Low-skilled workers may regain
their skills training when unemployed.
Empirical evidence supports the fact that employment below an individual’s qualifications, in terms
of educational level, and loss of skill are important issues to consider. First, Arai et al (2000) show
that the probability of getting a qualified job is 70% lower for immigrants to Sweden born in Eastern
Europe, Asia or Africa, and 50% lower for those born in Latin America, than for similar natives.
Immigrants are overrepresented in only three out of 29 occupations, all of which require no education
or training. Second, Reitz (2001) shows that the under-utilization of immigrant skills is significant in
Canada. Finally, Nielsen et al (2004) show that a large fraction of the wage gap between immigrants
and natives in Denmark would disappear if immigrants could accumulate work experience.
This paper focuses on wages and unemployment and we therefore consider a search and matching
framework, which allows vacancy supply to be affected by discrimination as well as both natives and
immigrants. The model is along the lines of Pissarides (2000), combined with an endogenous skill
choice. Acemoglu (2001) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) model the choice of skill requirements
by firms, while we consider the decision taken by workers. In Burdett and Smith (2002) and Aricó
(2009), workers with heterogeneous training costs take an investment decision in skill-acquisition before
entering the job market, while we allow for training any instance a worker loses skills. None of these
papers study the issue of discrimination. Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), Flabbi (2010), Mailath et al.
(2000), and Lang et al. (2005) study discrimination in the presence of search frictions, but without
loss of skill.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we set up a simple two sector model without
loss of skill and investigate the impact of discrimination on labour market performance. We show that
if there is only discrimination in the low-skilled sector, these workers are negatively affected both in
terms of reduced wages and higher unemployment, whereas high-skilled workers are unaffected. With
equal discrimination in the two sectors, all workers are negatively affected in terms of lower wages and
higher unemployment, where the impact is larger on high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers. We
then extend the model to include a risk of losing skills and the opportunity of exogenous training while
unemployed. In this case, discrimination in one skill sector affects discrimination in the other sector.
In case of discrimination in the low-skilled sector the employment prospects of the high-skilled workers
2Larsen (2001) has a similar set-up, but does not distinguish by origin.
3For simplicity, we disregard self-employment.
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improve, whereas in case of discrimination in both sectors, high-skilled workers are unambigously worse
off, while the impact on labour market performance for low-skilled workers is ambiguous. Finally, in
Section 4, we include endogenous training, and show that higher discrimination in the low-skilled
sector increases training of all workers, but the impact is stronger for immigrants. The proportion of
high-skilled immigrants then becomes higher than the proportion of high-skilled natives, despite the
fact that more immigrants tend to become low-skilled workers, that is more of them lose skills. This
is the case as the higher fraction of immigrants than natives training more than compensates for the
negative impact on immigrants’ skill level through loss of skill. Section 5 brings an evaluation of the
impact of discrimination on net output, where we show that the negative impact on net output is the
stronger when discrimination exists in the high-skilled sector compared to when it exists only in the
low-skilled sector. Section 6 includes simulations and Section 7 concludes.
2 A SIMPLE MODEL WITHOUT LOSS OF SKILLS
We develop a two sector equilibrium search and matching model where firms and workers are risk-
neutral and infinitely lived. The economy is populated by native, n, and immigrant workers, 1 − n,
which are exogenously given. The labour force is normalized to one.
Firms in sector h require skilled workers with productivity yh, while firms in sector l employ workers
with productivity yl, where yl < yh. Due to legal issues, firms may not direct vacancy supply towards
natives only. In this first simple version of the model, half of the native and immigrant workers will
be high-skilled and the other half will be low-skilled.
We model discrimination as a capricious rejection of immigrant applicants. If a negative external
event, such as media portraying immigrants in a negative manner, occurs after a vacancy was opened
but prior to a match with an immigrant worker, the immigrant is not offered a job. In this way,
discrimination implies that immigrants face a lower probability of getting a job than natives. This
occurs in a match with probability ds, s = h, l.4
2.1 Matching
Unemployed high-productivity workers search for jobs in sector h and low productivity workers
search in sector l. Productivity is sector specific. We assume that the value of skilled unemployment
is higher than the value of unskilled employment, implying it is not optimal for high-skilled workers
to search for low-skilled jobs.5
The matching function for sector s is assumed to have the functional form vαs u1−αs where vs is the
sectorial vacancy rate and us is the unemployment rate in sector s = h, l and 0 < α < 1. The transition
rate into employment for a native worker with productivity s is given by fNs = f(θs) = θαs , s = h, l
where θs = vs/us captures sectorial labour market tightness. As discrimination may disrupt a match,
the immigrant workers’ transition rates into employment are reduced relative to those of natives to
f Is = f(θs)(1− ds) = θαs (1− ds), s = h, l. The firm flow arrival rate is qs = θα−1s , s = h, l.
4An alternative is to model discrimination on exit, where an immigrant worker is either fired or forced to resign with
a higher probability than a native worker. This alternative set up delivers results similar to those in our model.
5A sufficient condition requires that the difference in productivities is sufficiently large yh/yl > 1.25 and unemploy-
ment smaller than employment. See Appendix 1a for details.
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2.2 Workers
The present discounted value of an unemployed worker of skill level s = h, l and origin J = N, I
(natives or immigrants) is given by
ρUJs = f
J
s (W
J
s − UJs ), J = N, I, s = h, l, (1)
where ρ is the discount rate. At the flow arrival rate fJs the worker gets a job and receives the value
W Js , which satisfies
ρW Js = w
J
s + σ(U
J
s −W Js ), J = N, I, s = h, l, (2)
where wJs is the wage in sector s for natives, J = N, or immigrants, J = I, and σ is job separation,
which is assumed to be exogenous and identical for both sectors and for natives and immigrants. All
parameter values are common knowledge.
2.3 Firms
The present discounted value of opening a vacancy in sector s is
ρV Js = qs(φs
(
XNs − V Ns
)
+ (1− φs) (1− ds)
(
XIs − V Is
)
)− k, s = h, l, (3)
where φs is the proportion of natives among the unemployed workers of productivity s and k is the
flow costs of maintaining an open vacancy. At the rate qsφs the vacancy is filled with a native worker
which provides a value XNs to the firm, and the rate qs (1− φs) (1− ds) the vacancy is filled with an
immigrant creating the value XIs . The present discounted value of a job in sector s occupied by a
worker of origin J satisfies
ρXJs = ys − wJs + σ(V Js −XJs ), J = N, I, s = h, l. (4)
Using (3), (4), the matching function and assuming free entry, Vs = 0, we obtain two equations
which determine labour market tightness, θs, s = h, l:
kθ1−αs (ρ+ σ)− φs
(
ys − wNs
)− (1− φs) (1− ds) (ys − wIs) = 0, s = h, l. (5)
For given wages, discrimination has a relative large negative impact, on the value of supplying a
vacancy when the pool of unemployed immigrants is relatively high, that is, when φs is small.
2.4 Wage Determination
Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining with equal bargaining power for worker and firm, result-
ing in the first order conditions: XJs = W Js −UJs , s = h, l, J = N, I, where we have imposed symmetry
and the free entry condition, Vs = 0, s = h, l and then substituting for equations (1)-(4) gives the
equilibrium wages, wJs :
wJs =
ρ+ σ + fJs
2 (ρ+ σ) + fJs
ys, J = N, I, s = h, l. (6)
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Skilled workers receive higher wages than low-skilled workers if fJh > f
J
l . The relative sign of work-
ers’ transition rates for the two sectors depend on the proportion of natives among the unemployed
workers of productivity s. When discrimination is relatively high, this tends to reduce the fraction of
native workers among the unemployed, φs, and therefore diminish the expected value of supplying a
vacancy which lowers labour market tightness. We determine φs below, which allows us to determine
the relative size of high-skilled and low-skilled workers’ transition rate. Due to discrimination, immi-
grants experience a lower transition rate than natives, and due to this, natives receive higher wages
than immigrants, wNs > wIs , s = h, l.
2.5 Unemployment
We derive steady state unemployment rates by equalizing the flows into and out of unemployment
and by using the fact that we assume natives and immigrants are equally divided into skilled and
low-skilled workers.6
The steady state unemployment rates then become:
uJs =
σ
fJs + σ
, s = h, l, J = N, I. (7)
Discrimination implies that a native worker’s transition rate is higher than an immigrant worker’s
transition rate, fNs > f Is and hence for each skill level, immigrants experience a higher unemployment
rate than natives, uIs/uNs > 1, s = h, l.
The proportion of natives among the unemployed workers of productivity s = h, l is then given by
φs =
uNs 0.5n
uNs 0.5n+ u
I
s0.5 (1− n)
=
1
1 + 1−nn (u
I
s/u
N
s )
.
Considering the relative size of φh and φl, we examine two different cases. In the first case,
discrimination is present in the sector employing low-skilled workers only, that is, dl > 0, dh = 0.
Then native skilled and immigrant skilled workers face the same transition rate, fNh = f
I
h = fh, which
implies that they have the same unemployment rate. Therefore, the proportion of natives among
the skilled workers only depends on the number of natives relative to the number of immigrants. As
low-skilled immigrants have a higher unemployment rate than their native counterparts, uIl /u
N
l > 1,
we obtain that the proportion of natives among the unemployed low-skilled workers is lower than the
proportion of natives among the unemployed skilled workers:
φl =
1
1 + 1−nn
(
uIl /u
N
l
) < φh = 1
1 + 1−nn
. (8)
In the second case, discrimination is equal in the two different sectors, dh = dl = d. This implies
that the relative size of φh and φl depends on the relative size of fh and fl:
φl =
1
1 + 1−nn
(
fNl + σ
)
/
(
f Il + σ
) , φh = 1
1 + 1−nn
(
fNh + σ
)
/
(
f Ih + σ
) . (9)
The proportion of natives among the unemployed low-skilled workers is lower than the proportion
6The flow equilibrium equations are σeNs 0.5n = fNs uNs 0.5n, s = h, l and σeIs0.5 (1− n) = fIs uIs0.5 (1− n) , s = h, l.
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of natives among the unemployed skilled workers if and only if the transition rate for high-skilled
workers is lower than the transition rate for low-skilled workers, i.e. φl Q φh if and only if fh Q fl.
Hence, a relative high transition rate reduces the number of natives among the unemployed, as the
impact of the transition rate is higher for natives than immigrants.
2.6 Labour Market Tightness
Labour market tightness for the skilled sector and low-skilled sector is determined by inserting
wages from equation (6) into equation (5):
kθ1−αs − φs
ys
2 (ρ+ σ) + θαs
− (1− φs) ys (1− ds)
2 (ρ+ σ) + θαs (1− ds)
= 0, s = h, l. (10)
Comparing the values of labour market tightness in the high-skilled and low-skilled sectors, we
obtain the following: as productivity is higher for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers,
this tends to increase labour market tightness in the skilled sector relative to the low-skilled sector.
However, discrimination also affects the expected profitability of supplying a vacancy and therefore the
vacancy supply. In the first case, when there is no discrimination for skilled workers, dl > 0, dh = 0,
supplying vacancies toward low-skilled workers is even less profitable, and labour market tightness is
higher for skilled workers than low-skilled workers, θh > θl. This results in a higher transition rate
for high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers, fh > fl. In the second case, where dh = dl = d > 0,
labour market tightness in the high-skilled sector is higher than labour market tightness in the low-
skilled sector, provided discrimination is not too high. This can be shown in the following way. In case
of no discrimination, θh > θl and φh = φl = 11+(1−n)/n . As discrimination increases, the proportion
of natives among the unemployed workers fall as they are only indirectly affected through reduced
vacancy supply. As labour market tightness and thereby the worker’s transition rate is higher for
skilled workers than for low-skilled workers, the negative impact is larger for the former. Hence,
the proportion of natives increases more for the high-skilled workers than for the low-skilled workers,
potentially resulting in a level of discrimination where labour market tightness is higher for low-skilled
than for skilled workers. Hence, when discrimination is not too high, θh > θl, the result is fh > fl and
wJh > w
J
l , J = N, I. Furthermore, in this case, high-skilled workers experience a lower unemployment
rate than low-skilled workers.
2.7 No Loss of Skill and Higher Discrimination
In this section, we examine the impact on labour market performance due to an increase in dis-
crimination. We consider the two different cases. In the first case, discrimination is only present in the
low-skilled sector and in the second, discrimination is present at an equal level in both sectors. Proofs
of propositions are given by straightforward differentiations of the involved equations.
2.7.1 Discrimination of Low-skilled Workers
When only low-skilled workers are discriminated against, dh = 0, dl > 0, we observe the following.
Proposition: when discrimination is only present in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, an
increase in discrimination reduces labour market tightness in the low-skilled sector, dθl/ddl < 0. Con-
sequently, the low-skilled workers’ wages fall and their unemployment rate increases. The reduction of
6
wages and the increase in unemployment is higher for immigrants than natives,
∣∣dwNl /ddl∣∣ < ∣∣dwIl /ddl∣∣,
duNl /ddl < du
I
l /ddl, implying an increase in inequality between natives and immigrants. The proportion
of natives among the low-skilled unemployed workers decreases, dφl/ddl < 0 whereas the proportion
of natives among the high-skilled workers is unaffected, dφh/ddl = 0. Labour market tightness and
thereby the unemployment rates and wages for skilled workers, are also unaffected.
Higher discrimination in the sector employing low-skilled workers has a direct negative impact on
labour market tightness for low-skilled workers. The reduction in labour market tightness reduces
all low-skilled workers’ transition rates and as immigrants are also directly negatively affected, their
transition rates fall more than the transition rate of natives. Therefore, the unemployment rate for
low-skilled workers increases, again more for immigrants than natives. Finally, the reduction of the
transition rate reduces the bargaining position of all low-skilled workers, but more for immigrants
than for natives, which implies that all low-skilled wages fall and the negative impact is larger for
immigrants than for natives. Hence, inequality between natives and immigrants increases.
As skilled workers are not affected by discrimination, the inequality between high-skilled and low-
skilled workers increases, both in terms of wage differences and unemployment rates. Hence, if dis-
crimination is only present in the sector employing low-skilled workers, discrimination increases wage
differences between all skilled and all low-skilled workers, for both natives and immigrants, beyond
what is due to a pure productivity difference.
2.7.2 Discrimination of High-skilled and Low-skilled Workers
In the second case, both skilled and low-skilled workers are discriminated against, dh = dl = d > 0.
In this case we obtain the following around dh = dl = 0.
Proposition: when discrimination is present in both sectors, that is, dh = dl = d > 0, an increase in
discrimination reduces labour market tightness in both sectors, but the impact on the sector employing
skilled workers is the largest, |dθh/dd| > |dθl/dd|. All workers’ wages fall and their unemployment rate
increases. The reduction of wages and the increase in unemployment is larger for immigrants than
natives,
∣∣dwNs /dd∣∣ < ∣∣dwIs/dd∣∣, duNs /dd < duIs/dd, implying an increase in inequality between natives
and immigrants. The proportion of natives among the unemployed workers decreases, and the negative
impact is greater for skilled workers, |dφh/dd| > |dφl/dd|, corresponding to a decrease in inequality
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in terms of unemployment rates.
When discrimination increases by the same amount in both sectors, there is a direct negative
impact on labour market tightness for all workers. The reduction in labour market tightness reduces
all workers’ transition rate and as immigrants are also directly negatively affected, their transition rate
falls more so than the transition rate of natives. Therefore, the unemployment rate for low-skilled
workers increases, again more for immigrants than natives.
The bargaining position decreases for all workers as their transition rate falls, and the larger decline
for immigrants results in lower wages and as the impact on wages is larger for immigrants than for
natives, this implies more inequality between natives and immigrants.
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3 LOSS OF SKILL AND EXOGENOUS TRAINING
The impact of discrimination is potentially amplified if workers are subject to the risk of losing
skills during unemployment. Therefore we include this possibility in our model by allowing for skill
loss during periods of unemployment, shifting the worker from being a high-skilled to a low-skilled
worker. Unemployed workers who lose their skills can only search for jobs in the low-productivity
sector. Low-skilled workers may regain their skills by training when unemployed, where their training
opportunities arrive at an exogenous rate.
3.1 Workers
The present discounted value of the unemployed skilled worker of origin J = N, I is modified to
ρUJh = f
J
h (W
J
h − UJh ) + λ
(
UJl − UJh
)
, J = N, I, (11)
where λ is the rate by which the high-skilled unemployed worker loses skills and becomes a low-skilled
unemployed worker with the value UJl :
ρUJl = f
J
l (W
J
l − UJl ) + γ
(
UJh − UJl
)
, J = N, I, (12)
where γ is the rate by which low-skilled workers regain their skills. This value is assumed to be
exogenous, an assumption which is modified in the next section.
The present discounted value for employed workers is still given by equation (2).
3.2 Firms
The present discounted value of posting a vacancy in sector s is given by equation (3), the value
of a job occupied by a worker of origin J , XJs , satisfies equation (4) and labour market tightness,
θs, s = h, l, is determined by equation (5).
3.3 Wage Determination
As before, wages are determined by Nash Bargaining with equal bargaining power for worker and
firm.
Using equations (2)-(4), (11) and (12) gives the equilibrium wages with loss of skill and exogenous
training for high-skilled workers, and low-skilled workers
wJh =
λfJl yl + yh
(
2
(
(ρ+ σ)µ+ fJh (ρ+ γ)
)
+ fJl
(
λ+ ρ+ ρρ+σf
J
h
))
DJ
, (13)
wJl =
γfJh yh + yl
(
2µ (ρ+ σ) + fJh (ρ+ γ) + f
J
l
(
2 (ρ+ λ) + ρρ+σf
J
h
))
DJ
, (14)
where µ = (ρ+ λ+ γ) and DJ = 2
(
2 (ρ+ σ)µ+ fJh (ρ+ γ)
)
+ fJl
(
2 (λ+ ρ) + ρρ+σf
J
h
)
. As before,
high-skilled workers receive higher wages than low-skilled workers if fh > fl. Wages in one sector
are dependent on labour market conditions in the other sector due to the risk of losing skills and the
probability of regaining skills. The transition rate of both sectors will affect wages in both sectors.
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Hence, when considering discrimination, wages in one sector are directly affected by discrimination
in this sector and indirectly affected by discrimination in the other sector. High-skilled natives have
higher wages than high-skilled immigrants as they have a higher transition rate from unemployment
into employment and therefore a better wage bargaining position.
3.4 Unemployment
The flow equilibrium equations determining the unemployment rates now includes the flows between
low-skilled and high-skilled unemployment.7 This gives the unemployment and employment numbers,
where J = N, I, nN = n and nI = 1− n:
νJh =
σnJ(
σ + fJh +
(
fJl + σ
)
λ
γ
) , νJl = λγ σnJ(σ + fJh + (fJl + σ) λγ) (15)
eJh =
fJh n
J(
σ + fJh +
(
fJl + σ
)
λ
γ
) , eJl = λγ fJl nJ(σ + fJh + (fJl + σ) λγ) .
We note the following. Irrespectively of case, unemployment of natives as a fraction of the total
number of natives is always lower than the unemployment for immigrants as a fraction of the total
number of immigrants for each skill group, νIs/ (1− n) > νNs /n, s = h, l. In the first case, when
dh = 0 and dl > 0, we find that employment of high-skilled immigrants is higher than employment
of high-skilled natives, eIh/ (1− n) > eNh /n, whereas employment of low-skilled natives is higher than
employment of low-skilled immigrants, eNl /n > e
I
l / (1− n). This is the case as the transition rate is
identical for high-skilled natives and immigrants but lower for low-skilled immigrants than low-skilled
natives. This implies that a larger fraction of the high-skilled immigrants will be employed compared
to the fraction of high-skilled natives, and similarly that a greater fraction of low-skilled natives will
be employed compared to the fraction of low-skilled immigrants employed.
In the second case, both employment fractions relative to the total number of natives and im-
migrants, respectively, are higher for natives than for immigrants: eNs /n > eIs/ (1− n) , s = h, l. The
intuition is here that equal discrimination for both high- and low-skilled immigrants reduces employ-
ment of both groups relative to the natives.
The unemployment rates, that is, the number of unemployed as a fraction of the labour force for
each skill level, are then again represented by equation (7): uJs =
νJs
νJs +e
J
s
= σ
fJs +σ
, s = h, l, J = N, I.
However, as γνJl = λν
J
h , J = N, I we obtain that the proportion of natives among each skill group for
the two different cases are identical.
7We have for J = N, I, and nN = n and nI = 1− n:
σeJs n
J = fJs ν
J
s n, s = h, l, σe
J
hn
J + γνJl n
J = fJh ν
J
hn
J + λνJhn
J ,
σeJl n
J + λνJl n
J = fJl ν
J
l n
J + γνJl n
J ,
and uNh + e
N
h + ν
N
l + ν
N
l = n, ν
I
h + ν
I
h + e
I
l + ν
I
l = 1 − n. Hence we need that γνJl = λνJh , J = N, I and using the
formulas above we obtain:
νJh +
fJh
σ
νJh +
fJl
σ
λ
γ
νJh +
λ
γ
νJh = n
J .
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φh =
νNh
νNh + ν
I
h
=
1
1 + νIh/ν
N
h
=
1
1 + (1−n)n
(σ+fIh+(fIl +σ)
λ
γ )
(σ+fNh +(fNl +σ)
λ
γ )
.
and
φl =
1
1 +
(
νIl /ν
N
l
) = 1
1 + (1−n)n
λ
γ (σ+fIh+(fIl +σ)
λ
γ )
λ
γ (σ+fNh +(fNl +σ)
λ
γ )
= φh = φ. (16)
In a steady state, the flows between high- and low-skilled workers are identical and the fraction of
natives in the unemployment pool is the same for high- and low-skilled workers.
3.5 Labour Market Tightness
Labour market tightness for the skilled sector and low-skilled sector is still determined by equation
(5). We substitute for wages from equations (13) and (14) to obtain
kθ1−αh
µ
=
∑
J=N,I
φJh
yh
(
2µ (ρ+ σ) + fJl (ρ+ λ)
)− λfJl yl
DJ
, (17)
kθ1−αl
µ
=
∑
J=N,I
φJl
yl
(
2µ (ρ+ σ) + fJh (ρ+ γ)
)− γfJh yh
DN
, (18)
where φNs = φ and φIs = (1− φ) (1− ds), s = h, l. Loss of skill during a period of unemployment
and exogenous retraining implies that labour market tightness in each sector is dependent on labour
market conditions in both sectors through the impact on workers’ bargaining position and thereby
wages.
Comparing the values of labour market tightness in the high-skilled sector and the low-skilled sector
obtains the following: productivity is higher for skilled workers than for low-skilled workers, which tends
to increase labour market tightness in the skilled sector relative to labour market tightness in the low-
skilled sector. In addition, as discrimination for low-skilled workers is always higher than or equal to
discrimination for high-skilled workers, this further increases labour market tightness for high-skilled
workers relative to labour market tightness for low-skilled workers. Hence, θh > θl, resulting in fh > fl
and wJh > w
J
l , J = N, I.
3.6 Loss of Skill, Exogenous Training, Higher Discrimination and More
Immigrants
When unemployed workers are subject to loss of skills during their unemployment experience, the
results on the impact of discrimination change, as now the two sectors are interrelated.
3.6.1 Discrimination in the Low-skilled Sector
As all workers risk losing skills during unemployment, discrimination against low-skilled workers
will affect both low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
Proposition: when discrimination is only present in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, an
increase in discrimination reduces labour market tightness and wages in the low-skilled sector, dθl/ddl <
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0, dwJl /ddl < 0 J = N, I, and also reduces wages and increases labour market tightness in the high-
skilled sector, dwJh/ddl < 0, J=N,I, dθh/ddl > 0. Consequently, the low-skilled workers’ unemployment
rate increases, dul/ddl > 0 and high-skilled workers’ unemployment rate falls, duh/ddl < 0. Inequality
in terms of unemployment between all high-skilled and low-skilled workers increases.
Proof: We assume discrimination is present in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, and differ-
entiate the labour market tightness conditions, (17) and (18) with respect to θh, θl and dl and obtain
dθl/ddl < 0 and dθh/ddl < 0. Next, we differentiate equations (13) and (14) with respect to dl to
obtain dwJs /ddl < 0, s = h, l. Hence, θl and ws s = h, l fall and θh increases. Differentiating equation
(7) with respect to dl using the above results then gives dul/ddl > 0 and duh/ddl < 0.
Low-skilled immigrants suffer from both direct and indirect effects of discrimination, while low-
skilled natives are only negatively affected by the indirect effects. Hence, all low-skilled workers
face lower wages and higher unemployment. The fall in low-skilled workers’ wages and transition
rates decreases the value of the outside option for all skilled workers, due to the risk of losing skills.
Skilled workers’ bargaining position is then damaged and they accept lower wages. This makes high-
skilled workers more attractive and therefore, more vacancies are opened in this sector, reducing
unemployment. Wages rise as there are more vacancies around, but this impact is smaller than the
impact of the original wage reduction. Hence, the existence of discrimination in the low-skilled sector
provides a positive employment externality on the high-skilled sector; it actually increases employment
of all high-skilled workers.
In terms of inequality we obtain the following. Workers experience more wages dispersion between
immigrants and natives. The reduction in unemployment for high-skilled natives and increase in
unemployment for low-skilled workers increase inequality between high- and low-skilled workers in
terms of unemployment.
3.6.2 Discrimination of all High-skilled and Low-skilled Workers
When all immigrants may experience discrimination, both low and high-skilled workers, the result
is more ambiguous.
Proposition: when discrimination is present in both sectors, dh = dl = d > 0, an increase in dis-
crimination reduces labour market tightness in the high-skilled sector, dθh/dd < 0, dwJh/dd < 0 J =
N, I, whereas the impact on labour market tightness is ambiguous for the low-skilled sector and the
impact on all wages is most likely to be negative. Consequently, the impact on high-skilled workers’ un-
employment rate is positive whereas the impact on low-skilled workers unemployment rate is ambiguous.
Proof: We assume discrimination is present in both sectors, dh = dl = d > 0, and differentiate the
labour market tightness conditions, (17) and (18) with respect to θh, θl and d and obtain, illustrated in
a θh, θl diagram, a negatively sloped curve for the θl (θh) locus representing the low-skilled sector given
the sufficient condition, γyh − yl (ρ+ γ) > 0 and an ambiguously sloped θh (θl) locus representing the
high-skilled sector. When discrimination increases, the latter curve shifts towards the left. It cannot be
determined whether the θl (θh) locus representing the low-skilled sector shifts upwards or downwards.
In the case when it shifts upwards it shifts less than the locus representing labour market tightness
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for the high-skilled sector. Hence, θh falls and the impact on θl is ambiguous. Considering equations
(13) and (14) we obtain that dwJh/ddl < 0, s = h, l is the most likely result, as there are no direct
positive impact on wages, and labour market tightness in the low-skilled sector can only increase, if
wages fall (see equation (5)). Using equation (7) we obtain duJh/ddl > 0 and the sign of du
J
l /ddl > 0
is ambiguous.
Discrimination in the high-skilled sector directly reduces the return to vacancy supply and as high-
skilled workers’ bargaining position is diminished, they accept lower wages. This is also the case
for low-skilled workers due to discrimination in the low-skilled sector. The direct impact on labour
market tightness therefore tends to raise unemployment. However, reduced employment prospects in
one sector affect the other sector due to skill loss and the probability of regaining skills. As labour
market tightness, and therefore the worker’s transition rate, is higher in the high-skilled sector than
in the low-skilled sector, the direct impact of higher discrimination is larger in the high-skilled sector
than in the low-skilled sector. Therefore, wage moderation among low-skilled workers may enhance
the profitability of supplying a vacancy in the low-skilled sector to such an extent that labour market
tightness increases in this sector and therefore, also the low-skilled worker’s transition rate. As labour
market tightness for high-skilled workers unambiguously falls, their unemployment rate increases,
whereas the impact on the unemployment rate for low skilled workers is ambiguous.
Hence, again we notice that due to loss of skill and the possibility of losing and regaining skills,
discrimination in one sector is important for the other sector. In this case, where discrimination is
present in both sectors, low-skilled workers may gain in terms of better employment chances.
3.6.3 More Immigrants
In this section we determine the impact of a higher fraction of immigrants. As firm’s vacancy
supply is affected by the fraction of natives among the job searchers, labour market tightness will be
affected.
Proposition: when discrimination is either present in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, or in
both sectors, dh = dl = d > 0, more immigration, a higher (1− n), reduces labour market tightness and
wages in both sectors, dθs/d (1− n) < 0, dwJs / (d (1− n)) < 0, J = N, I, Consequently, both unemploy-
ment rates increase, dus/d (1− n) > 0. The unemployment rates of natives increase more than that
of immigrants. This reduces inequality in terms of unemployment rates, duNs /dn > duIs/dn, s = h, l.
Proof: We assume discrimination is present in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, or in both
sectors, dh = dl = d > 0, and differentiate the labour market tightness conditions, (17) and (18) with
respect to θh, θl and 1−n and obtain dθs/ (1− n) < 0, s = h, l. Considering equations (13) and (14) we
obtain that dwJs /d (1− n) < 0, s = h, l and from equation (7) we obtain duJs /d (1− n) > 0, s = h, l.
When there is an increase in the share of immigrants, a firm is more likely to match with an
immigrant. This increases the expected duration of a vacancy, as discrimination implies that more
immigrants are associated with a lower matching frequency. The profitability of opening a vacancy falls.
All workers’ wages fall as their bargaining position is weakened. This reduction in wages increases the
transition rates for workers, modifying the wage reduction. Fewer vacancies increase unemployment of
all workers. As native workers’ transition rate is higher than immigrants’ transition rate, the impact is
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stronger for natives than for immigrants. Therefore natives suffer a higher increase in unemployment,
whereby the relative unemployment rate for immigrant relative to native workers decreases.
4 LOSS OF SKILL AND ENDOGENOUS TRAINING
In this section we change the assumption of exogenous training. Here, training is assumped to be
endogenous, that is, it is now an endogenous decision, whether a worker, who has lost skills, wants to
retrain or remain as a low-skilled worker.
4.1 Workers
The present discounted value of the unemployed skilled worker of origin J = N, I and of em-
ployed high- and low-skilled employment are still given by equations (11) and (6) whereas the present
discounted value of a low-skilled worker of origin J = N, I is modified to
ρUJl = f
J
l (W
J
l − UJl ), J = N, I. (19)
A low-skilled unemployed worker can choose to search for a job in the low-skilled sector or engage
in training. To become high-skilled unemployed, a worker pays a per period cost c ∈ U [0; 1] which is
specific to that training opportunity. The effort needed by a worker to retrain in a particular training
opportunity depends on the location and time where this training is provided, whether she is healthy
or sick, the family situation at that moment, etc. These factors vary over time. Therefore, the fact
that a worker chooses to train in one opportunity does not imply that the worker also train next time
he or she loses skills.
The worker compares the present discounted value of training, UJt (c), to the value of being an
unemployed high-skilled worker. The value of training is given by
ρUJt = γ
′ (UJh − UJl )− cJ , J = N, I,
where γ′ is the exogenous rate by which the training programme ceases. When this happens, the
worker returns to the labour force as a skilled worker. The marginal worker, with cost cˆJ , J = N, I is
indifferent between training and remaining low-skilled. The marginal worker thus satisfies the condition
ρUJl = ρU
J
t (ĉ
J), J = N, I. (20)
Workers with costs of training c ≤ ĉJ , J = N, I train, whereas workers with higher costs do not.
4.2 Firms
The present discounted value of posting a vacancy in sector s is given by equation (3), the value
of a job occupied by a worker of origin J , XJs satisfies equation (4) and labour market tightness,
θs, s = h, l, is determined by equation (5).
4.3 Wages
Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining and with bargaining power equal to one half. Using
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equations (11), (6) as well as equation (2)-(4) we obtain:
wJh =
yh
(
(ρ+ λ) + fJh
ρ
ρ+σ
)
+ yl
λfJl
2(ρ+σ)+fJl
2 (ρ+ λ) + fJh
ρ
ρ+σ
, J = N, I, (21)
wJl = yl
ρ+ σ + fJl
2 (ρ+ σ) + fJl
, J = N, I. (22)
High-skilled workers receive higher wages than low-skilled workers, wJh > w
J
l , J = N, I, as yh > yl. if
fh > fl. As was the case with exogenous training, high-skilled sector wages are affected by conditions
in the low-skilled sector due to the risk of losing skills. However, low-skilled wages are no longer
affected by conditions in the high-skilled sector as training opportunities arrive randomly. High-skilled
immigrant wages are then directly affected by discrimination in both the low- and the high-skilled sector
whereas low-skilled immigrant wages are only affected by discrimination in the low-skilled sector. As
in the two previous versions of the model, natives receive higher wages than immigrants as natives
experience a higher transition rate into employment than immigrants.
4.4 Labour Market Tightness
Replacing for wages in the equation for labour market tightness in equation (5) to obtain the
equations for labour market tightness with loss of skill and endogenous training for the two sectors:
kθ1−αh (ρ+ σ)− φhΩNh − (1− φh) (1− dh) ΩIh = 0, (23)
kθ1−αl − yl
φl
2 (ρ+ σ) + fl
− yl (1− φl) (1− dl)
2 (ρ+ σ) + fl (1− dl) ) = 0, (24)
where ΩJh =
yh(ρ+λ)− ylλf
J
l
2(ρ+σ)+fJ
l
2(ρ+λ)+fJh
ρ
ρ+σ
, J = N, I. In order to determine the relative size of labour market
tightness in the high and low productivity sector, we need to determine the relative size of φh and φl,
which in turn depends on the relative size of fh and fl.
In the section on unemployment and skills below, we show that φh < φl in case 1 where dh = 0
and dl > 0. In this case, labour market tightness for high-skilled workers is higher than labour market
tightness for low-skilled workers for the following reason: high-skilled workers have higher productivity
and there are relative more immigrants in the unemployment pool for high-skilled workers than for
low-skilled workers, and immigrants receive lower wages than natives and are therefore relatively more
profitable (and there is no direct negative impact on labour market tightness in the high-skilled sector
from discrimination).
In case 2, we cannot determine the relative size of φh and φl. Therefore the relatively size of
labour market tightness is ambiguous.
4.5 Training
We insert equation (19) into the training equation (20), substitute for values and then wages, to
obtain the equation determining the marginal worker who trains:
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cˆJ =
γ′fJh yh − ylf
J
l
2(ρ+σ)+fl
(
ρ+γ′
ρ+σ f
J
h + 2 (ρ+ λ+ γ
′)
)
2 (ρ+ λ) + fJh
ρ
ρ+σ
, J = N, I. (25)
A necessary condition for workers to train is that the right hand side is positive. For this to be the
case, the probability of obtaining a high-skilled job needs to be high, fJh high, and so does the difference
in productivity achieved by training, yh − yl. We also note that the right hand side of equation (25)
is less than one, which ensures that cˆJ < 1.
Proposition: when discrimination is present only in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, more
immigrants than natives acquire training, cˆI > cˆN . When discrimination is present in both sectors,
dh = dl = d > 0, the relative number of immigrants and natives acquiring training is ambiguous.
When only low-skilled workers are discriminated against, low-skilled immigrants are worse relative
to low-skilled natives, whereas high-skilled immigrants and natives consider the same labour market
tightness. Consequently, it is more attractive to acquire training for immigrants than for natives.
When discrimination is facing both low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the relative training decision
is ambiguous. Discrimination for high-skilled workers tends directly to raise the number of high-skilled
natives relative to high-skilled immigrants, but discrimination for low-skilled workers on the other hand
tends to raise the number of training immigrants. On the whole, it cannot be determined whether
in case of equal discrimination in the two sector, there are more or less natives than immigrants who
train.
4.6 Unemployment and Skills
The flow equilibrium equations determining the unemployment rates now include the flows between
low-skilled and high-skilled unemployment, where the flow from the low-skilled to high-skilled labour
force is endogenous. The flow into low-skilled unemployment from high-skilled unemployment is equal
to the flow from low-skilled unemployment into high-skilled unemployment.8
As unemployment rates are the number of unemployed relative to the number of workers in the
labour force for each skill level, we obtain the same unemployment rates as in the previous two versions
of the model, equation (7).
The proportions of natives among the unemployed workers of high-skill level and low-skilled level
become:
φh =
1
1 + 1−nn κ
, φl =
1
1 + cˆ
N
cˆI
1−n
n κ
,
8We have for J = N, I, and nN = n and nI = 1− n:
σeJl n
J + λuJl n
J = fJl ν
J
l n
J + cˆJνJl n, cˆ
JuJl = γ
′νJt , ν
N
h + e
J
h + e
J
l + ν
J
l + ν
J
t = n
J .
We need γ′νJt = λνJh = cˆ
JνJl and obtain the following unemployment and employment equations
νJh =
σnJ
σ + fNh +
(
fNl + σ
)
λ
cˆN
+ σλ
γ′
, νJl =
λ
cˆN
σnJ
σ + fNh +
(
fNl + σ
)
λ
cˆJ
+ σλ
γ′
,
eJh =
fJh n
J
σ + fJh +
(
fJl + σ
)
λ
cˆJ
+ σλ
γ′
, eJl =
λ
cˆJ
fJl n
J
σ + fJh +
(
fJl + σ
)
λ
cˆJ
+ σλ
γ′
.
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where κ =
σ+fNh +(f
N
l +σ) λcˆN +
σλ
γ′
σ+fIh+(fIl +σ)
λ
cˆI
+σλ
γ′
. We note that the proportion of natives among the high-skilled
unemployed workers will be greater than the proportion of natives among the low-skilled unemployed
workers if natives choose to train more than immigrants, that is φh T φl if cˆN T cˆI . This is the
case as more natives training directly increases the labour force of high-skilled natives relative to high
skilled immigrants and at the same time increases the number of low-skilled immigrants relative to
high-skilled immigrants.
Concerning the impact of relative training on both proportions of natives among the unemployment,
that is on both φh and φl, we find that more natives acquiring skills relative to immigrants, that is a
higher cˆN/cˆI , has two impacts. A higher cˆN/cˆI increases unemployment of high-skilled natives relative
to unemployment of high-skilled immigrants, reducing κ and thereby increases φh. A higher cˆN/cˆI also
directly reduces the fraction of natives among the low-skilled workers. The latter impact is the stronger
and therefore the impact of higher cˆN/cˆI on φl is negative.
In case 1, where discrimination is present in the low-skilled sector only, dh = 0 and dl > 0, the
proportion of natives among the unemployed workers is higher for low-skilled workers than high-skilled
workers as cˆN < cˆI . That is, more immigrants than natives train and therefore there are more natives
in the low-skilled unemployment pool than in the high-skilled one, φh < φl. In the second case,
where all immigrants are discriminated against, dh = dl = d > 0, relative training of natives and
immigrants is ambiguous and therefore the relative size of φh and φl is ambiguous.
Finally, we consider the proportion of skilled workers in the economy. This fraction will depend on
where there is discrimination:
νJh + e
J
h
nJ
=
σ + fJh
σ + fJh +
(
fJl + σ
)
λ
cˆj +
σλ
γ′
, J = N, I.
In the first case, where discrimination is present in the low-skilled sector only, dh = 0 and dl >
0, the proportion of high-skilled workers is higher among immigrants than natives, as low-skilled
immigrants have a stronger incentive to train than low-skilled natives. In the second case, when
there is discrimination in both sectors, dh = dl = d > 0, we cannot immediately determine whether
the proportion of skilled workers is higher among natives than among immigrants.
4.7 Loss of Skill, Endogenous Training, Higher Discrimination and More
Immigrants
In this section we examine the impact of discrimination and immigration on labour market perfor-
mance given training is endogenous.
4.7.1 Discrimination in the Low-skilled Sector
When discrimination is present in the low productivity sector, dh = 0, dl > 0, native wages will
be higher for both high and low productivity workers, wNs > wIs , s = h, l. High-skilled native workers
have higher wages than immigrants, even though there is no discrimination in the high-skilled sector,
as the risk of losing skills reduces the skilled worker’s bargaining power when discrimination exists for
low-skilled workers. We therefore have the following result.
Proposition: when training is endogenous and discrimination exists in the low-skilled sector, dh =
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0, dl > 0, an increase in discrimination induces more low-skilled unemployed immigrant workers to
train, dĉI/ddl > 0, reduces labour market tightness and wages in the low-skilled sector, dθl/ddl < 0,
dwJl /ddl < 0 J = N, I, and reduces wages and increases labour market tightness in the high-skilled
sector, dwJh/ddl < 0, J=N,I, dθh/ddl > 0. Consequently, the low-skilled workers’ unemployment rate
increases, dul/ddl > 0 and high-skilled workers’ unemployment rate falls, duh/ddl < 0. Natives also
train more but the impact is smaller than the impact on immigrants, dĉN/ddl > 0, dĉI/ddl > dĉN/ddl.
The proportion of high-skilled workers among the immigrants increases relative to the proportion of
high-skilled workers among the natives.
Proof: We assume dh = 0, dl > 0, and differentiate the labour market tightness equations, (17) and
(18) with respect to θh, θl and dl and consider the impact around dl = 0 to obtain dθl/ddl < 0 and
dθh/ddl > 0 implying dul/ddl > 0 and duh/ddl < 0. Differentiating the wage equation for low-skilled
workers, (22) with respect to dl gives dwl/ddl < 0 and as the high-skilled sector is not directly affected
around dl = 0 by dl but only through wages, high skilled wages must fall. Differentiating equation
(25) with respect to dl gives dĉJ/ddl > 0, J = N, I. As low-skilled immigrants are more negatively
affected than natives, due to the direct impact from discrimination, and natives are only affected through
reduced labour market tightness in the low skilled sector, we obtain that dĉI/ddl > dĉN/ddl and hence
d
νIh+e
I
h
nI
/ddl > d
νNh +e
N
h
nN
/ddl.
Low-skilled immigrants are affected both directly and indirectly by discrimination, while low-skilled
natives are only negatively affected by the indirect effect. Hence, all low-skilled workers face lower
wages and higher unemployment. The fall in low-skilled workers’ wages and transition rates lowers
the value of the outside option for all high-skilled workers, due to the risk of losing skills. High-skilled
workers’ bargaining position then worsens, implying they accept lower wages. High-skilled workers
are now more attractive, which increases vacancy supply in this sector, thus reducing unemployment.
Discrimination in the low-skilled sector reduces wages in the high-skilled sector, as the positive impact
due to more vacancies is smaller than the original wage reduction. Hence, as with exogenous training,
the existence of discrimination in the low-skilled sector provides a positive employment externality on
the high-skilled sector; vacancy supply and thus employment increase in the high-skilled sector.
Both the diminished employment prospects for low-skilled workers and the higher transition rate
for high-skilled workers induce low-skilled immigrants and natives to train more. Training therefore
increases. As immigrants are both directly and indirectly affected by discrimination whereas natives
are only indirectly affected, immigrants have greater incentives to acquire skills. Thus, the positive
impact on training is larger for immigrants than for natives. This furthermore leads to an increase
in the proportion of high-skilled among the immigrants which is greater than the increase in the
proportion of high-skilled among the natives.
Hence, notice here that discrimination for low-skilled workers has a positive impact on the distri-
bution of skills for immigrants relatively to natives. While discrimination does imply that low-skilled
immigrants suffer more than native low-skilled workers, in terms of lower employment chances and
lower wages, they at the same time have larger incentives to acquire training. For those with suf-
ficiently low training costs, they train to a larger extent than natives and, by doing so, escape the
discrimination influenced low-skilled sector.
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4.7.2 Discrimination of all High-skilled and Low-skilled Workers
When all immigrants may experience discrimination, both low and high-skilled workers, the result
is, as above with exogenous training, more ambiguous.
Proposition: when training is endogenous and discrimination is present in both sectors, dh = dl =
d > 0, an equal increase in discrimination has an ambiguous impact on training, reduces labour market
tightness in the low-skilled sector and all wages, dθl/dd < 0, dwJs /dd < 0 J = N, I, s = h, l whereas
the impact on labour market tightness is ambiguous for the high-skilled sector. Consequently, the
unemployment rate for low-skilled workers increases, duJl /dd < 0 whereas du
J
h/dd has an ambiguous
sign. The impact on the proportion of natives among the high and low-skilled unemployed workers is
ambiguous.
Proof: We assume dh = dl = d > 0, and differentiate equations (17) and (18) with respect to θh, θl
and d. We obtain dθl/ddl < 0 and an ambiguous impact on labour market tightness in the high-skilled
sector, hence dul/ddl > 0, and duh/ddl has an ambiguous sign. Differentiating the wage equation for
low skilled workers, (22), with respect to dl gives dwl/ddl < 0 and there is both a negative impact on
labour market tightness in the high-skilled sector and also lower labour market tightness in sector l,
dwh/ddl < 0. Differentiating equation (20) with respect to dl gives ambiguous signs for both natives
and immigrants, and hence the impact on the proportion of skilled among the immigrants and natives
is ambiguous.
Notice here that we cannot determine whether labour market tightness increases or fall in the
high-skilled sector. The reason is that despite the fact that discrimination directly tends to reduce
labour market tightness in the high-skilled sector, the negative impact on wages has a positive impact
on labour market tightness.
4.7.3 More Immigrants
The final impact of more immigrants is equivalent to what we obtained when training was exoge-
nous.
Proposition: when discrimination is either present in the low-skilled sector, dh = 0, dl = d > 0, or in
both sectors, dh = dl = d > 0, a higher fraction of immigrants, (1− n), reduces labour market tightness
and wages in both sectors, dθs/d (1− n) < 0, dwJs / (d (1− n)) < 0 J = N, I, and reduces training for
both natives and immigrants, dcˆJ/(d(1 − n)) < 0, J = N, I. Consequently, both unemployment rates
increase, dus/d (1− n) > 0. The unemployment rates of natives increase more than that of immigrants
reducing inequality in terms of unemployment rates, duNs /dn > duIs/dn, s = h, l.
Proof: We assume discrimination is present in only the low-skilled sector or both sectors, dh =
0, dl > 0 or dh = dl = d > 0, and differentiate equations (17) and (18) with respect to θh, θl and
1 − n taking the impact on training and thereby φs into account, and obtain a negative impact on
labour market tightness in both sectors. Differentiating equation (25) with respect to θh gives a positive
sign and with respect to θl gives a negative sign. The negative impact on θh is stronger than the
negative impact on θl and training therefore falls. Differentiating the wage equation for high skilled
and low-skilled workers, (21) and (22), with respect to 1− n gives a negative sign.
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As was the case with exogenous training, the increase in the share of immigrants, increases the
likelihood that a high-productivity firm matches with an immigrant. This increases the expected
duration of a vacancy, as discrimination implies that more immigrants are associated with a lower
matching frequency. As a result, fewer vacancies are opened. As before, we still have that the reduction
in wages increases the transition rates for workers, modifying the wage reduction.
The additional impact of the introduction of endogenous training varies depending on where dis-
crimination exists. In case one, the reduction of labour market tightness for high-skilled workers
has a stronger impact on training for natives than immigrants. However, the relative impact of lower
labour market tightness for immigrants is ambiguous and therefore, with endogenous training, the
impact on the fraction of natives training is also ambiguous. In the low-skilled sector, the impact of
both high- and low-skilled labour market tightness on the fraction of natives training is ambiguous
and therefore, this impact may either reinforce or diminish the initial impact of immigration on labour
market tightness. In case two, this additional impact is also ambiguous, as we cannot even determine
whether lower labour market tightness for high skilled workers leads to immigrants training more than
natives or the reverse.
When the reduction in training is larger for natives than immigrants, the share of natives among
the unemployed high-skilled workers fall and there is a further reduction of labour market tightness
in the high-skilled sector. This in turn corresponds to relatively more natives among the low-skilled
workers, which will tend to increase labour market tightness and therefore reduce unemployment. As
argued above, this is most likely to happen when discrimination is present in the high-skilled sector
also, and in this situation, more immigration may be very little harmful for the low-skilled workers.
Conversely, if the reduction in training is more severe for immigrants than natives, the fraction
of natives among the unemployed high-skilled workers will tend to increase, which will modify the
negative impact on high-skilled labour market tightness but at the same time reduce the fraction of
natives among the low-skilled workers. This will lead to a further reduction in labour market tightness
in the low-skilled sector. In this case, the impact on wages and unemployment for high-skilled workers
may be negligible, whereas it will be even stronger for low-skilled workers.
5 NET OUTPUT
In this section, we examine the impact of discrimination on net output when training is exogenous
for the two different cases investigated throughout the paper.
We use a utilitarian welfare function, which is obtained by adding all individuals’ and firms’ steady
state flow values of net output in both the high- and the low-productivity sector. To disregard con-
gestion externalities, we assume that α = 1/2, that is we impose the traditional Hosios condition
(Hosios 1990), where the elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy is equal to the bargaining
power of workers in a symmetric Nash bargaining situation. Using the asset equations for workers
and firms in the two sectors, imposing the flow equilibrium conditions and considering the case of
no discounting, i.e., ρ → 0,9 we can write the welfare function as production minus vacancy costs,
W = ehyh + elyl − vhθhk − vlθlk which is equal to W =
∑
s=h,l
((
eNs + e
I
s
)
ys −
(
eNs +
eIs
1−ds
)
σfsk
)
.
9We ignore discounting in order to compare different steady states without needing to consider the adjustment process.
This is common in the literature, see for example, Engström et al (2005).
19
Assuming risk neutral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence, wages will not feature in
the welfare function.
We consider the impact on welfare resulting from an increase in discrimination for the two cases
we have studied throughout the paper plus an additional case, where discrimination may differ for
the two different sectors. We then discuss the impact on net output resulting from a higher fraction
of immigrants. In case 1, we consider the increase in discrimination when dh = 0, dl > 0 around
dh = dl = 0 :
∂W
∂dl
=
deh
ddl
yh +
del
ddl
yl − σdeh
ddl
fhk − σ
(
del
ddl
+ el
)
flk − σel
2fl
dθl
ddl
. (26)
In case 2, with discrimination in both sector, dh = dl = d > 0, we obtain around dh = dl = 0:
∂W
∂d
=
deh
dd
yh +
del
dd
yl − σ
(
deh
dd
+ eIh
)
fhk − σeh
2fh
dθh
dd
− σel
2fl
dθl
dd
− σ
(
del
dd
+ el
)
flk. (27)
When there is only discrimination in the low-productivity sector, two divergent effects emerge. Low-
skilled employment falls for low-skilled workers, which tends to reduce net output, and employment
increases for high-skilled workers, which increases net output. The impact of reduced hiring costs
represented by the last three terms has a smaller impact on net output than the impact through
employment.
Equation (27) shows that as discrimination in the high-productivity sector reduces employment in
sector h, this decreases net output in that sector. However, as the impact on labour market tightness
is ambiguous for the low-productivity sector, the impact on low-skilled employment, and thereby net
output, is also ambiguous. As above, the impact of reduced hiring costs represented by the last three
terms has a smaller impact on net output than the impact through employment.
Substituting for employment changes, wages and labour market tightness equations when ρ = 0
and around dh = dl = d = 0 gives:
∂W
∂dl
= −eNl
−fh (yh − σfhk − (yl − σflk)) + σ
(
1 + λγ
)
(yl − σflk)
σ + fh + (fl + σ)
λ
γ
+ σflk
 (28)
∂W
∂d
= −
(
1 +
λ
γ
)
eIl
(
σ γλ
fh
fl
(yh − σfhk) + σ (yl − σflk)
σ + fh + (fl + σ)
λ
γ
+ σflk
)
< 0. (29)
Notice that for ρ = 0 we obtain ys−σfsk = ws, s = h, l and from equation (4) we have (yh − σfhk) >
(yl − σflk). We observe that net output unambiguously falls when discrimination is present in both
sectors, but there is a counteracting impact on net output when welfare only affects the low-skilled
workers, for the following reason. Higher discrimination for low-skilled workers reduces low-skilled
immigrants’ transition rate, and thereby employment and net output in the low-skilled sector. On
the other hand, reduced employment prospects for low-skilled workers reduce the bargaining power of
the high-skilled immigrant workers as, in case they lose their skills, they have a lower transition rate.
Lower wages in the high-skilled sector therefore improve net output in the high-skilled sector and thus
contributes positively to net output. The impact on net output due to only low-skilled discrimination
is ambiguous.
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Finally, we consider the impact on net output from higher discrimination for high-skilled workers
compared to the impact from discrimination of low-skilled workers. In this third case where dh > 0
and dl = 0 we obtain around dh = dl = 0 :
∂W
∂dh
=
deh
ddh
yh +
del
ddh
yl − σ
(
deh
ddh
+ eIh
)
fhk −− σel
2fh
dθh
ddh
k − σel
2fl
dθl
ddh
k − σ del
ddh
flk.
Substituting for employment changes, wages and using the labour market tightness equations we
obtain:
∂W
∂dh
= −eIh
σ
(
1 + λγ
)
(yh − σfhk) + fl λγ (yh − σfhk − (yl − σflk))(
σ + fNh +
(
fNl + σ
)
λ
γ
) + σfhk
 < 0. (30)
Discrimination in the high-productivity sector reduces net output as the reduction in employment
and thereby net output, in the high productivity sector dominates the increase in employment and
net output in the low-skilled sector. This results from the downward pressure on low-skilled wages.
Comparing the negative impact on net output due to discrimination in the high-skilled sector to the
effect resulting from discrimination in the low-productivity sector, we see that the negative impact
on net output is strongest if discrimination is present in the high-skilled sector. The reason being
that the negative impact on employment, and thus net output, is increasing in productivity. Hence,
discrimination in the high-skilled sector is more severe than in the low-skilled sector. We therefore
have the following result:
Proposition: The negative impact on net output is more severe when discrimination is present in
the high-skilled sector, dh > 0, dl = 0, than when discrimination is present in the low-skilled sector,
dh = 0, dl > 0.
Proof: This immediately follows from comparing equation (28) and (30) and noting that yh −
σfhk > yl − σflk and σfhk > σflk.
When the fraction of immigrants increases, we obtain dWd(1−n) = −dWdn where
dW
dn
=
(
deNh
dn
+
deIh
dn
)
yh −
(
deNh
dn
+
deIh
dn
1
1− dh
)
σfhk − σ
((
eNh + e
I
h
1
1− dh
))
1
2fh
dθh
dn
k+
((
deNl
dn
+
deIl
dn
)
yl − σ
(
deNl
dn
+
deIl
dn
1
1− dl
)
flk − σ
(
eNl + e
I
l
1
1− dl
)
1
2fl
dθl
dn
k
)
,
which after substituting for employment changes, wages and using the labour market tightness equa-
tions when ρ = 0 reduces to
dW
d (1− n) =
(
eIh
1− n −
eNh
n
)
(yh − σfhk) +
(
eIl
1− n −
eNl
n
)
(yl − σflk) , (31)
Proposition: The impact on net output due to a higher fraction of immigrants, dW/d(1 − n) is
ambiguous in case 1 and 3 and negative in case 2, where discrimination is equally present in both
sectors.
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Proof. Notice that yh − σfhk > yl − σflk. In case 1, when dh = 0 and dl >0, the value of the first
parenthesis of equation (31) is positive, whereas the value of the third is negative. Hence, the sign is
ambiguous. In case 2, when dh = dl = d > 0, the values of first parenthesis and the third are negative
and hence dW/ (1− n) < 0. Finally, in case 3, when dh > 0, dl =0, the value of the first parenthesis
is negative and the value of the third is positive giving an ambiguous sign.
The impact of more immigration on net output varies dependent upon in which sector there is
discrimination. In case 1, when discrimination is present in the low skilled sector only, high-skilled
immigrant employment as a fraction of the number of total immigrants is higher than high-skilled
native employment as a fraction of the total number of natives. The reverse holds for low-skilled
workers. Therefore, a higher fraction of immigrants in the labour force contributes to more high-skilled
production but less low-skilled production, where the latter impact is the larger. As the production
contribution to net output is higher for high-skilled workers than for low skilled workers, we can
therefore not determine the total impact on net output.
In case 2, when discrimination is equally present in both sectors, employment and thereby pro-
duction, decreases for both skill groups reducing net output. Finally when only high-skilled workers
experience discrimination, increasing the fraction of immigrants raises the production contribution
from low skilled workers, but as high-skilled workers produce less, the total impact on net output is
ambiguous.
6 SIMULATIONS
The model with exogenous training is illustrated given the following parameter values (annual
values). The discount rate is set to ρ = 0.08, the separation rate is σ = 0.1 (See Millard and Mortensen
1997), α = 0.5 (Pissarides 1986), yl is normalised to one, and yh is set equal to 1.3 to obtain a relative
large difference between productivity levels in the two sectors and thereby differences which are visible
in the graphs. We consider Sweden as Sweden is a country where discrimination against immigrants
is relatively low. The fraction of natives was around n = 0.88 in Sweden in 2013 (www.oecd.org). The
parameters λ and γ are set to as to match the fraction of high-skilled unemployed workers relative
to long-term unemployed workers for natives and immigrants. From the model we have that these
fraction are νNh /ν
N
l = ν
I
h/ν
I
l = λ/γ. For Sweden in 2013 we divide workers into two groups, those who
have been unemployed for more (the long-term unemployed) or less (the short-term unemployed) than
6 months measured in 1000 persons. We then have that νNh /ν
N
l = (266− 64.4)/64.4 =3.1 for natives
and νIh/ν
I
l = (144.8 − 56.8)/56.8 = 1.5 (Statistika Centralbyrån, www.scb.se). In the model, these
two numbers are supposed to be identical equal to λ/γ and we therefore pick a number in between
but closest to the number for natives, as there are relatively more of them, namely λ = 0.27 and
γ = 0.108 giving λ/γ = 2.5. The hiring costs are set equal to k = 0.4 to match an unemployment
rate for both high- and low-skilled native workers for Sweden in 2013 when dh = dl = 0.2 (this
discrimination level is chosen so as to obtain a significant difference between natives and immigrants)
νN
n =
νNh +ν
N
l
n =
(1+λγ )σ
(σ+fh+(fl+σ)λγ )
= (1+2.5)0.1(0.1+2+(1.2+0.1)2.5) = 0.063, where the total unemployment rate
for the natives are found using equation (15) (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). A discrimination rate of
dh = dl = 0.2 gives an unemployment rate of immigrants of νI/ (1− n) =
(
νNh + ν
N
l
)
/ (1− n) = 0.078.
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This is then the unemployment rate for immigrants which corresponds to discrimination of this level.
The remaining difference in between unemployment for natives and immigrants (0.162 in 2013) is due
to other factors than discrimination.
We present six graphs in this section and additional robustness check in the appendix. In the
first three graphs we present the simulations for transition rates, unemployment and wages for the
high-skilled and low-skilled sector for natives and immigrants, where we increase discrimination in the
low-skilled sector from dl = 0 to dl = 0.5 while keeping discrimination in the high productivity sector
dh = 0. In the next three graphs we again consider the impact on transition rates, unemployment and
wages for the high-skilled and low-skilled sector for natives and immigrants where we let dh = dl = d
and increase d from 0 to 0.5.
Regarding Figure 1, due to different productivities, the transition rates for high-skilled workers
is well above discrimination for low-skilled workers. There is very little movement in the transition
rates for native low-skilled workers as dl increases, whereas the transition rate for high-skilled workers
increases slightly, consistent with their wage decrease and the transition rate for low-skilled immigrants
falls significantly with dl. These results for the transitions rates imply that the unemployment rate
is much higher for low-skilled workers than high-skilled workers, moves very little for natives and
high-skilled immigrant workers, but increases a lot for low skilled immigrant workers when dl increases
(see Figure 2). Concerning wages, both high-skilled and low-skilled immigrant wages decrease with
discrimination in the low-skilled sector, however, with a sharper decline for low-skilled workers as this
sector is directly and negatively affected while the former decline is consistent with the increase in the
transition rate for high-skilled workers (Figure 3).
When we consider the impact of discrimination in both sectors (Figures 4-6), we obtain a sharp
decrease in the transition rates for both high- and low-skilled immigrants, whereas the transition rates
for natives are almost unchanged. As the transition rate is greater for high-skilled than low-skilled
workers, the former decreases more than the latter. The discrimination rate of high-skilled immigrants
actually ends up lower than the transition rate for low-skilled natives when discrimination becomes
relatively high and therefore unemployment for high-skilled immigrants exceeds the unemployment
rate of high-skilled native workers at this discrimination level (Figure 5). As labour market tight-
ness corresponding to the transition rate for natives is relatively unaffected by discrimination, the
unemployment increase for low-skilled immigrant workers is similar to the increase for low-skilled im-
migrants in the first case, where there is only discrimination in the low-skilled sector. In case 2, there
is a much sharper decrease in both high- and low-skilled immigrant wages than in case 1, due to that
the possibility of skill loss for high-skilled and the probability of regaining skills for low-skilled implies
an interaction effect between the two sectors. This will amplify any negative effect on one of the two
sectors. High-skilled immigrants’ wages now fall more than low-skilled immigrants’ wages due to the
larger direct negative impact on high-skilled immigrant transition rate and the corresponding larger
decrease in their bargaining power.
In the appendix we examine how the parameter values affect the results in the two cases, when
dh = 0, dl = 0.2 and dh = dl = d = 0.2 and show the following. In panel 1, we notice that a higher
λ will actually reduce unemployment as wages fall, which raises workers’ transition rates. When γ
increases, unemployment increases together with higher wages, resulting is a lower transition rate into
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employment for all workers, but particularly for low-skilled workers as they are directly affected. In
panel 3, we see that a higher separation rate has a huge positive impact on unemployment and a
large negative impact on wages as both workers and firms are worse off when the separation rate
into unemployment is higher. Panels 4 and 5 show how the results are modified if we allow for
different separation rates for the two sectors (the modified equations are given in the Appendix).
When σl = 0.1 then when σh increases we see, as expected, that the unemployment rate for high-
skilled workers increases, whereas the unemployment rate for low-skilled workers actually falls. This is
due to the fact that there is no direct impact on unemployment for the low-skilled workers but wages
fall for all workers as workers are worse off when σh increases (also for low-skilled workers due the
probability of regaining skills). The negative impact for wages will be larger for high-skilled workers
than low-skilled workers as there is a direct negative impact on firms in the high productivity sector
but not in the low productivity sector. Similarly, as is seen in panel 5, when σh = 0.1 and we let σl
increase, then uJl , J = N, I increases whereas u
J
h falls slightly. This is the case as all wages fall due to
the worsened bargaining power and the negative impact on low-skilled workers’ wages is much larger
than the negative impact on high-skilled workers as there is no direct negative impact on firms in the
high-skilled sector.
Panel 6 shows that, as higher hiring costs in general reduce vacancy supply, all wages fall and
unemployment increases due to lower transition rates for all workers. Panels 7-12 show that the impact
on unemployment and wages from increasing the parameter values, when we have equal discrimination
in both sectors, is similar to the impact when discrimination only exists in one sector. The next 12
panels show the impact of increasing discrimination to 0.5 for the two cases and confirm that nothing
changes qualitatively.
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7 CONCLUSION
We formulated a model of discrimination against immigrants within a search and matching frame-
work including high-skilled and low-skilled workers. First, we considered an equal number of high- and
low-skilled workers for both natives and immigrants, and examined the impact of higher discrimina-
tion on wages, unemployment and inequality. We showed that when there is only discrimination in
the low-skilled sector, these workers experience a wage reduction and higher unemployment whereas
the high-skilled workers are not affected. Equal discrimination in both sectors, on the other hand im-
plied that all workers were negatively affected, high-skilled workers more severely so than low-skilled
workers as the transition rate for the former group of workers was the larger. We then extended the
model to include loss of skill during unemployment as well as an exogenous probability of regaining
skills, and again considered the impact of discrimination as well as immigration on labour market
performance. We then obtained that discrimination in one sector affected the other sector as well and
when discrimination was present in the low-skilled sector only, the employment perspectives of the
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high-skilled workers improved. When both sectors were affected by equal discrimination, high-skilled
workers were worse off, whereas the impact on labour market performace for the low-skilled sector were
ambiguous. Next, we considered endogenous skill choice as a response to loss of skill and evaluated how
discrimination and immigration affected wages, unemployment as well as the fraction of skilled workers
among natives and immigrants, respectively. We showed that higher discrimination in the low-skilled
sector increased training of all workers, and the impact was stronger for immigrants than natives. The
proportion of high-skilled immigrants was higher than the proportion of high-skilled natives, despite
the fact that more immigrants became low-skilled workers due to discrimination and the risk of losing
skills. Hence, a higher fraction of immigrant than natives training more than compensated for the
negative impact on immigrants’ skill level through loss of skill. Finally, we considered the impact of
discrimination and immigration on net output and some illustrative simulations for the model of loss
of skill and exogenous training.
In conclusion, when considering the impact of discrimination on labour market performance given
loss of skill during an unemployment experience, it is important to establish whether discrimination
predominately exists in the sector employing low-skilled workers or in both sectors. This paper has
revealed the theoretical results for the different cases. Future empirical research may confirm which
cases are the most relevant to consider for different skill and ethnicity groups.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Condition for Values, No Loss of Skill
In this appendix we derive a condition for when rUJh > rE
J
l , that is that the value of being a skilled
unemployed worker is higher than the value of being a low-skilled worker.
The value equations are given by equations (1) and (2), inserting for wages from equations (6)
giving the solutions
ρUJs =
fJs
2 (ρ+ σ) + fJs
yh, ρEs =
ρ+fJs
2(ρ+σ)+fJs
yl,s = h, l,J = N, I.
In the first case where dh = 0 and dl > 0, the value of being a skilled unemployed worker is higher
than the value of being a low-skilled worker for both natives and immigrants, rU Ih = rU
N
h > rE
N
l >
rEIl , if and only if
fh
2 (ρ+ σ) + fh
yh >
ρ+ fl
2 (ρ+ σ) + fl
yl ⇔ yh
yl
>
ρ+ fl
fh
2 (ρ+ σ) + fh
2 (ρ+ σ) + fl
.
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As 2(ρ+σ)+fh2(ρ+σ)+fl <
σ+fh
σ+fl
as sufficient condition is
yh
yl
>
σ
fh
+ 1 =
σ
σ+fh
fh
σ+fh
+ 1 =
uNh
eNh
+ 1.
Hence for unemployment relatively to employment less than a quarter, the condition becomes
yh/yl > 1.25.
In the second case where dh = dl = d > 0, then rUNh > rE
N
l giving the same condition as above
and rU Ih > rE
I
l if and only if
fh (1− d)
2 (ρ+ σ) + fh (1− d)yh >
ρ+ fl (1− d)
2 (ρ+ σ) + fl (1− d)yl ⇔
yh
yl
>
ρ+ fl (1− d)
fh (1− d)
2 (ρ+ σ) + fh (1− d)
2 (ρ+ σ) + fl (1− d) .
As 2(ρ+σ)+fh(1−d)2(ρ+σ)+fl(1−d) <
σ+fh(1−d)
σ+fl(1−d) as sufficient condition is
yh
yl
>
σ
fh (1− d) + 1 =
σ
σ+fh(1−d)
fh(1−d)
σ+fh(1−d)
+ 1 =
uIh
eIh
+ 1.
Hence the same condition apply as above.
8.2 The Equations for The Model with Skill Loss and Exogenous Training
and with Different Separation Rates
When we assume we have two different separation rate for high- and low-skilled workers, σh and
σl, the model becomes more complex. As in the other simulations, we assume that α = 0.5. The
equations for labour market tightness are now given by
kfh (ρ+ σh)− φ
(
yh − wNh
)− (1− φ) (1− dh) (yh − wIh)) = 0,
kfl (ρ+ σl)− φ
(
yl − wNl
)− (1− φ) (1− dl) (yl − wIl )) = 0.
The wage equations becomes
wJh =
λfJl yl + yh
(
2 ρ+σlρ+σh
(
µ (ρ+ σh) + f
J
h (ρ+ γ)
)
+ fJl
(
(ρ+ λ) + fJh
ρ
ρ+σh
))
(
2 ρ+σlρ+σh
(
2µ (ρ+ σh) + fJh (ρ+ γ)
)
+ fJl (2 (λ+ ρ)) +
ρ
ρ+σh
fJh
)
wJl =
γfJh
ρ+σl
ρ+σh
yh + yl
(
2µ (ρ+ σl) + f
J
h (γ + ρ)
ρ+σl
ρ+σh
+ fJl
(
2 (ρ+ λ) + ρρ+σh f
J
h
))
2 ρ+σlρ+σh
(
2µ (ρ+ σh) + fJh (ρ+ γ)
)
+ fJl (2 (λ+ ρ)) +
ρ
ρ+σh
fJh
where fh = fNh , f
N
l = fl and f
I
h = fh (1− dh) and f Il = fl (1− dl) and where µ = (ρ+ λ+ γ). We
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also obtain the the proportion of natives among the high- and low-skilled workers
φh =
1
1 + (1−n)n
(
σh+fNh +
(
σh
σl
fNl +σh
)
λ
γ
)
(
σh+fIh+
(
σh
σl
fIl +σh
)
λ
γ
)
= φl = φ.
The unemployment rates changes to
uJh =
σh
fJh + σh
, uJl =
σl
fJl + σl
, J = N, I.
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9 ROBUSTNESS TEST
The next 12 figures consider case 1 where dh = 0, dl = 0.20 and the same parameter values as original
chosen. We then vary on parameter at a time keeping the other values fixed.
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The next 12 figures consider case 2 where dh = 0.20, dl = 0.20 and the same parameter values as
original chosen. We then vary on parameter at a time keeping the other values fixed.
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The next 12 figures consider case 1 where dh = 0, dl = 0.50 and the same parameter values as
original chosen. We then vary on parameter at a time keeping the other values fixed.
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The next 12 figures consider case 2 where dh = 0.50, dl = 0.50 and the same parameter values as
original chosen. We then vary on parameter at a time keeping the other values fixed.
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